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Jimmy Carter’s and 
James Miller’s Revenge: 
The Reasons and the 
Consequences for Presidential 
and Congressional Power 
of Measures to Ban 
Congressional “Earmarks”  
Joseph White† 
Abstract 
At the end of 2010, the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives appeared to abandon a fundamental aspect of Con-
gress’s power of the purse. By adopting a “moratorium” on “earmarks” 
in appropriations bills, as well as on analogous specific details in tax 
and other legislation, both chambers appeared to give the President, or 
at least the presidential branch represented by White House staff and 
OMB, dominance over policy decisions that long have been considered 
central to Congress’s role. Is this change substantive or cosmetic, why 
did it occur, and will this be the new normal? This Article recounts 
how the politics of distributing benefits to individual states and districts 
developed over the past half century. What from the perspective of 
Congress seemed like presidential imperialism was rebuffed. But the 
executive branch’s strategies forced Congress to make the politics of 
distribution more visible. That in turn activated attitudes in U.S. 
politics that view Congress as inherently corrupt and that inherently 
disadvantage Congress in a battle for public opinion. Congressional 
minority parties sought to mobilize this sentiment against the majority 
party. After they captured the House and Senate in 2006, congressional 
Democrats sought to blunt the criticism with procedural reforms. Both 
opposition to the Democrats and opposition to government per se then 
united congressional Republicans around the more radical measures 
adopted in 2010. Now, although some Republicans with experience in 
budgeting believe the moratorium is damaging Congress, they also 
cannot see a way to return to previous practice. 
 
† Luxenberg Family Professor of Public Policy, in the Department of Poli-
tical Science, and Director of the Center for Policy Studies, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
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Introduction 
“Shortly after he took office,” Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly wrote, 
“Jimmy Carter announced his intention to launch a comprehensive 
review of the design and funding of water projects and declared his 
intention to request—via the FY 1978 Supplemental Appropriations 
Bill—that Congress not fund nearly twenty water projects that had 
been authorized by Congress.”1 This set off a pitched battle with his 
own party in Congress, with a temporary compromise in 1977 succeeded 
by a veto when Congress funded the projects again in the next year’s 
Energy and Water Appropriations bill. President Carter vetoed the bill, 
and although he won his fight against congressional efforts to override 
the veto, the battle was widely viewed as nearly irreparably damaging 
his relationships with Congress. The distinguished presidency scholar 
Charles O. Jones wrote that “no action is more frequently cited as 
typifying the problems that the president had with Congress.”2 
In 1988, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director James 
C. Miller III, as part of a Reagan administration campaign against 
“pork,” issued a directive that agency leaders ignore report language 
that instructed them to spend on projects not included in the 
President’s budget.3 He “failed dramatically.”4 Congressional responses 
were typified by a Republican Senate Appropriations aide who said,  
1. For the most extensive report on the conflict, see Scott A. Frisch & 
Sean Q. Kelly, Jimmy Carter and the Water Wars: Presidential 
Influence and the Politics of Pork 2 (2008).  
2. Charles O. Jones, Keeping Faith and Losing Congress: The Carter 
Experience in Washington, 14 Presidential Stud. Q. 437, 437 (1984). 
Note that both Frisch and Kelly, and Jones argue that there were reasons 
why the attack on water projects made sense for Carter; nevertheless, the 
battle was widely viewed as an example of why Carter was a relatively 
unsuccessful President. 
3. Rob Porter & Sam Walsh, Earmarks in the Federal Budget 
Process, Harv. L. Sch. Fed. Budget Pol’y Seminar 10 (Robert 
Allen & Robert Brown eds. 2008), available at http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/faculty/hjackson/Earmarks_16%28rev%29.pdf. 
4. Id. 
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“No one liked what Miller did . . . He was bringing a questionable 
constitutional judgment into the appropriations process. Even if he 
were right, we would just write it into the law. That’s just more work 
for us.”5 Miller withdrew his order to the agencies after congressional 
threats of retaliation.6  
If President Obama wanted to eliminate a similar list of water 
projects, he could do it, and Congress would have no recourse. He would 
not need to veto; he could simply not include the projects in his own 
proposed budget. This is the result of the policies against “earmarks” 
that were adopted by congressional Republicans after the 2010 election. 
Under these rules, much of the report language that Director Miller 
wanted agencies to ignore should not exist. It would be out of order 
and an ethics violation to create it. 
In short, Congress has abandoned part of its power of the purse, 
handing it to the President. In this Article I seek to explain what 
happened and why it happened and suggest what that illustrates about 
the drift of power from Congress to the President. 
I. The New Rules 
The rules of the U.S. House of Representatives Republican Confer-
ence, as adopted on November 15, 2012, concluded with the following 
language: 
Standing Orders for the 113th Congress 
Earmark Moratorium  
It is the policy of the House Republican Conference that no Mem-
ber shall request a congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or 
limited tariff benefit, as such terms have been described in the 
Rules of the House.7 
The definition of an “earmark” in the Rules of the House is: 
 
5. Confidential interview with a member of the staff of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee. Between 1983 and 2008, I conducted more 
than 300 interviews with participants in aspects of federal budgeting, for 
a variety of projects. More than a hundred of those interviews, including 
the one quoted here, provided information about “pork-barrel” politics. 
In 2013–14 I conducted eighteen more interviews about the rise and 
decline of earmarking. Unattributed quotes below are from either the 
recent or earlier interviews. All interviews were conducted under the 
condition that I neither quote nor attribute any material without direct 
written permission. 
6. Porter & Walsh, supra note 3, at 11. 
7. Rules of the House Republican Conference for the 113th Congress, 
Republican National Committee, www.gop.gov/113th-rules/ (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2014). 
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a provision or report language included primarily at the request 
of a Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator pro-
viding, authorizing or recommending a specific amount of discre-
tionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending 
authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan author-
ity, or other expenditure with or to an entity or targeted to a 
specific State, locality or Congressional district, other than 
through a statutory of administrative formula-driven or competi-
tive award process.8 
This moratorium interacts with a series of other provisions that 
were added to the House Rules in 2007. Rule XXI Section 9(a)–(d) 
makes it out of order to consider any bill or joint resolution unless the 
accompanying report includes either a list of all earmarks and the other 
benefits included or a certification by the chair of the reporting 
committee that none are included.9 Similar restrictions are applied to 
amendments and conference reports. Then Rule XXIII, the House Code 
of Official Conduct, says that legislators who request any of these 
suspect provisions must “provide a written statement to the chair and 
ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction”10 stating 
their names; “in the case of a congressional earmark, the name and 
address of the intended recipient or, if there is no specifically intended 
recipient, the intended location of the activity”11; the purpose of the 
provision; and “a certification that the Member, Delegate, or Resident 
Commissioner or spouse has no financial interest in such congressional 
earmark or limited tax or tariff benefit.”12 Each committee is required 
to maintain the record of these statements, for public inspection.13 
Moreover, the rules forbid conditioning “the inclusion of language to 
provide funding for a congressional earmark” or other limited benefit in 
any bill, resolution, etc., “on any vote cast” by the recipient.14 In other 
words, it is an ethics violation for committee or party leaders to engage 
 
8. Rules of the House of Representatives, 113th Cong., R. XXI(9)(e) 
[hereinafter 113th House Rules], available at http://clerk. 
house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). The 
policies about limited tax and tariff benefits also deserve attention, but 
that analysis will not be included here. 
9. Id. at R. XXI. 
10. Id. at R. XXIII. 
11. Id.  
12. Id.  
13. Id. at R. XXIII(17). 
14. Id. at R. XXIII(16). 
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in quid pro quos in which they expect members to vote for their bills 
in return for benefits provided to their districts.15 
The moratorium in the House Republican Conference rules is 
enforced not only by peer pressure on Republicans but also through the 
ethics provisions. Democrats could request earmarks, but the 
Republicans are refusing to accept the disclosure forms—thereby 
putting any Democrat who makes a request in technical violation of the 
Rules of the House. As a result, the Democratic staff and leadership of 
the House Appropriations Committee have advised their members not 
to submit requests. 
The rules about “limited tax benefits” and “limited tariff benefits” 
may not be good public policy,16 but they do not raise significant 
questions about the distribution of power between Congress and the 
President. Presidents do not have authority to create exceptions to tax 
law, so these rules do not cede power to the President. But presidents 
and the rest of the executive branch do have authority to decide what 
to spend where, within the broad terms of appropriations. The language 
“primarily at the request of a Member”17 means that an item included 
in the President’s budget request or agency congressional justifications 
is not out of order. Therefore, the power conceded by Congress in 
foregoing earmarks flows to the President. 
The House rules alone would be enough to concede power to the 
President because they apply to conference reports. But the Senate has 
adopted its own, largely parallel, measures.18 Senate Rule XLIV defines 
“congressionally directed spending,” with the same disclosure 
requirements for each stage of the legislative process as in House Rule 
XXI.19 This includes the requirements that senators certify their lack of  
15. Id. at R. XXIII(16). See Sandy Streeter, Cong. Research Serv., 
RL34462, House and Senate Procedural Rules Concerning Ear-
mark Disclosure (2008), for a more extensive overview of the rules 
changes in both House and Senate in 2007. 
16. This provision would make it more difficult to ease the passage of tax 
legislation such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986 by providing “transition 
rules”; whether that is a good or bad thing depends on one’s opinion of 
the legislation that is passed and whether one sees unacceptable biases in 
who benefits from the exceptions.  
17. 113th House Rules, supra note 8, at R. XXI.  
18. Standing Rules of the Senate, 113th Congress, S. Doc. 113-18, 
67–69 (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
19. Compare id. at 67–69 with 113th House Rules, supra note 8, at R. XXI. 
There are some small differences in the processes for points of order and 
responsibility for certifications. The Senate language refers specifically to 
committee chairmen as certifying the lists, and one interview respondent 
emphasized that Senate chairs therefore have some flexibility in defining 
what an earmark is. Nevertheless, as discussed below, there appear to be 
some clear and restrictive understandings. 
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pecuniary interest in a request.20 Both Senate Republicans and Demo-
crats have separately adopted moratoria on requests. 
These developments in congressional procedure raise three logical 
questions. First, does this story involve powers that have historically 
been held by Congress and that are potentially of constitutional 
import? Certainly a substantial number of members and institutional 
staff from within Congress believe so. Second, are the changes in rules 
actually reflected in practice? The answer is an unqualified yes. Third, 
how did this happen, and could the development be reversed? The 
political developments toward first regulation and then the moratorium 
are a complicated story, which I can only sketch out in this space. The 
fact that the moratorium has not been included in House or Senate 
Rules may suggest it is especially likely to be reversed, but the path to 
that reversal seems quite difficult. 
These changes in the ability of Congress to formally direct spending 
to states and districts eliminates neither congressional interest in, nor 
all the ways that legislators may affect, the geographic distribution of 
federal benefits. Almost any government activity is likely to be of more 
interest in certain parts of the country than others. Western legislators 
will pay more attention to policies about public lands, which are a much 
larger portion of Western states; urban legislators will have 
disproportionate interest in supporting urban mass transit; and 
representatives of communities with large military bases will be 
especially interested in the educational Impact Aid program. So support 
for programs in general, rather than projects in particular, is shaped by 
geographic politics. When programs operate through formulae, such as 
the distribution of highway funds, the process of developing those 
formulae is rife with distributional conflict.21  
In addition, if a project is large enough to have impact beyond one 
state, it is not an “earmark” in the terms of the rule. That is 
particularly relevant to large military procurements. The C-17 cargo 
plane, for example, involves significant manufacturing in Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Georgia, and Missouri. Congress, for a number 
of years, insisted on buying new planes, over administration objections, 
and the earmark moratorium would not prevent that.22 A veteran aide 
explained that if you look at the F-35 fighter jet, that is built by “five  
20. Standing Rules of the Senate, supra note 18, at R. XLIV(6); see also 
id. at R. XLIV(8)(e). 
21. The politics of formulae are especially prominent in the Senate because 
most formulae allocate by state. See Frances E. Lee, Bicameralism and 
Geographic Politics: Allocating Funds in the House and Senate, 29 Legis. 
Stud. Q. 185 (2004); see also Frances E. Lee & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences 
of Equal Representation (1999). 
22. See John M. Donnelly, C-17’s Backers Seek One More Lift, CQ Wkly., 
June 21, 2010, at 1490–92. 
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companies, with Lockheed as the prime contractor. . . . It probably 
covers every state and 2/3 of the districts.” So buying more F-35s is 
not an earmark. “If they said, ‘instead of building this tail rudder in 
the Netherlands it should be in my district,’ that’s an earmark.” But 
“the Lockheed Martins aren’t involved in the debate about earmarking 
because it had no material effect on them.”23 In fact, Lockheed gets a 
trivial share of its funding from earmarks.24  
Nevertheless, in military and many other categories of spending, a 
great many projects, procurements, and grants qualify as “congression-
ally directed spending” under the new rules. To the extent legislators 
care about or believe their voters care about specific allocations to their 
districts or states, the new policies make them more dependent on favor 
from the executive branch. 
II. Legislative Power and Distributive Benefits 
The constitutional provision that “[n]o Money may be drawn from 
the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law”25 
does not give Congress sole control of spending. After all, laws require 
the President’s signature. It does mean that the President cannot 
independently spend.  
The Framers feared an executive could use financial inducements 
to suborn legislators, as is seen by the Article 1, Section 6 ban on 
appointment of legislators to executive offices with executive bene-
fices.26 Editorialists and presidents have continually criticized Congress 
for attention to details that they claimed were beneath the legislature’s 
dignity.27 In his 1988 State of the Union address, in the course of  
23. Confidential interview, supra note 5. 
24. Lockheed in Fiscal Year 2010 received $17,200,000 in earmarks. Michael 
S. Rocca & Stacy B. Gordon, Earmarks as a Means and an End: The 
Link between Earmarks and Campaign Contributions in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, 75 J. Pol. 241, 247 (Jan. 2013) (citing Center for 
Responsive Politics and Taxpayers for Common Sense Data, available at 
www.opensecrets.org). To put that in perspective, Lockheed was awarded 
more than $37 billion in federal contracts for fiscal year 2013–more than 
2,000 times the earmarking figure from FY2010. See Aerospace & Defense 
Intelligence Report, Top-100 Defense Contractors 2013, http://www.bga-
aeroweb.com/Top-100-Defense-Contractors-2013.html (last visited Feb. 
19, 2015). 
25. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7. 
26. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 6.  
27. For an excellent review of the controversy over earmarks, the merits of 
the case, and the development of congressional procedures with regard to 
distributive benefits, see Scott A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly, Cheese 
Factories on the Moon: Why Earmarks Are Good for American 
Democracy (2011). Another fine and shorter overview of the terms and 
issues involved in earmarking is Porter & Walsh, supra note 3. 
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demanding an item veto, President Reagan mocked Congress for 
specifying funding for cranberry research, blueberry research, studies of 
crawfish, and the commercialization of wild flowers.28 Yet from a 
congressional perspective, the issue is not whether there will be pro-
grams with local benefits but who will decide which localities benefit. 
If the President decides, then he has a substantial tool with which to 
influence legislators and so get his way in Congress.  
Sometimes we might think the President used this power for a good 
cause. On behalf of President Johnson, James Webb, Administrator of 
NASA, informed House Minority Leader Charlie Halleck that if he 
supported a vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Purdue University 
would get some nice research grants.29 Webb not only made the deal 
but also promised the grants in a series of steps. He explained to 
Johnson that “I can implement it on an installment basis. In other 
words, the minute he kicks over the traces, we stop the installment.”30 
But there is no reason to assume what the President wants is good.  
Congress chooses the level of detail at which it controls spending. 
During the Federalist era, appropriations were quite general. When the 
Jeffersonians took over, appropriations became exceedingly specific.31 
With the growth of government even in the nineteenth century, it 
became impossible for Congress to be quite as specific as it was in 1804. 
But legislative and appropriations practice developed in ways that 
maintained the ability of Congress to direct benefits when it so chose. 
It could do so in three possible ways: 
(1) In Legislative Language. This had most authority but also could be 
inconveniently inflexible. For example, conditions might change making a 
specific project or activity less desirable, or simply less expensive; 
(2) In Report Language Accompanying the Legislation. Report language 
is not, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains, binding 
on the executive.32 Nor is an agency’s explanation, in its justifications to 
the Appropriations committee, of how it will divide up lump sums made 
available in appropriations acts. However, as GAO also explains, this 
principle of interpretation “merely says that the restrictions are not legally 
binding. The practical wisdom of making the expenditure is an entirely 
 
28. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 25, 1988) (transcript available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36035).  
29. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of 
Power 559 (Alfred A. Knopf ed. 2012). 
30. See id. at 560. 
31. See Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Admini-
strative History, 1801–1829, at 108–16 (1951). 
32. United States Government Accountability Office, Principles 
of Federal Appropriations Law 6–7 (3rd ed. vol. 2, 2004). 
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separate question. An agency that disregards the wishes of its oversight 
or appropriations committees will most likely be called upon to answer for 
its digressions before those committees next year. An agency that fails to 
‘keep faith’ with the Congress may find its next appropriations reduced 
or limited by line-item restrictions” 33; or 
(3) In Less Public Instructions by Leaders in Congress to Agency Officials, 
or Deals Between These Parties. Agency leaders’ reason for following these 
instructions is essentially the same as for obeying report language. The 
key legislator would normally be the chair of the relevant appropriations 
subcommittee—though the chair might often act as agent for colleagues. 
A veteran House Appropriations aide explained to me in the 1980s that 
“[i]n the old days, the subcommittee chair knew he had failed if something 
showed up in a bill . . . . On the Park Service, the report used to say, ‘the 
increase is for the Service’s highest priority programs. Then Mrs.  Hansen 
[Julia Hansen of Washington, the Interior subcommittee chair] used to 
write a letter to the Director: Dear Mr. Director, these are your  highest 
priorities.”34 
Congressional direction could then be applied to two different 
situations. In the first, the policy itself consists largely of choosing and 
locating projects. This is the classic “pork-barrel”35 of public works such 
as levees for rivers; dams for power, irrigation, and other purposes; 
dredging and maintaining harbors; roads and bridges and tunnels (and 
at one time canals).36 Other examples include military construction such 
as facilities on bases, as well as government buildings such as 
courthouses and post offices. Some appropriations bills were mainly lists 
of projects. Hence for the Public Works (later, Energy and Water) 
appropriations bills, members brought constituents to hearings, and 
both members and constituents testified about why, say, the Yazoo–
Mississippi Delta Levee Board should receive more funding. The 
executive agencies that operate public works programs, especially the  
33. Id.  
34. Confidential interview, supra note 5. 
35. The term “pork-barrel” has strong negative connotations, and I do not 
mean to endorse those connotations by using it. Nevertheless, the term is 
so common that it is used in most academic research on the phenomenon 
considered here—only recently being somewhat supplanted by 
“earmarking.” See John A. Ferejohn, Pork-Barrel Politics: Rivers 
and Harbors Legislation, 1947–1968 (1974); Linda R. Cohen & 
Roger G. Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel (1991); Robert M. 
Stein & Kenneth N. Bickers, Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: 
Policy Subsystems and American Democracy (1995). 
36. I distinguished “classic” from “new wave” pork-barrel spending in Joseph 
White, Making Connections to the Appropriations Process, in The 
Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and 
Policymaking in Washington 164–88 (Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. 
Shaiko & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2nd ed. 2004).  
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Army Corps of Engineers, were once described as reporting to Congress 
rather than the President—although in the case of the Corps, critics 
doubted it was responsible to anyone.37  
In the second situation, a policy might involve so many relatively 
small, discreet decisions that most would be made by the federal 
agencies, as with Great Society categorical grant programs, or the 
choices about geographic distribution involve discretionary purchases 
as part of agency operations—for example, defense procurement or 
R&D.38 Benefits could be distributed geographically by choosing what 
to buy or by quiet agreements to award a grant.  
Although they have always had significant influence due to their 
direct supervision of the bureaucracy, presidents have sought more 
control over distributive benefits.39 Conflicts can also involve serious 
policy disagreements, such as over environmental protection and total 
federal spending. It was on these grounds that President Carter con-
fronted Congress over water projects. 
III. Implementing the New Rules 
The effect of the new rules is most visible if one looks at the pro-
grams that were the arena of the classic “pork-barrel.” For example, 
one can compare the Military Construction section of the Veterans 
Affairs and Military Construction Appropriations for 201340 and 2009,41 
or the Corps of Engineers or Bureau of Reclamation sections of the 
Energy and Water bill for the same years.42 
In 2009, and for decades before, the bill or report would list 
projects. For each, it would report how much the President requested, 
how much the House bill provided, the Senate figure, the conference 
figure—depending on the stage of the process. There would be 
presidential proposals that were not funded, presidential figures that  
37. See Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the 
Nation’s Rivers (1951). 
38. See the discussion in Frisch & Kelly, supra note 27. For one of many 
sources on military spending, see generally Barry S. Rundquist & 
Thomas M. Carsey, Congress and Defense Spending: The Dis-
tributive Politics of Military Procurement (2002) (detailing the 
connection between congressional organization and defense contract dis-
tribution). 
39. See generally, John J. Hudak, Presidential Pork: White House In-
fluence Over the Distribution of Federal Grants (2014) 
(discussing presidential controls on federal spending and the practice of 
presidential earmarks). 
40.  H.R. Rep. No. 112-491, at 13 (2013). 
41.  H.R. Rep. No. 110-775, at 16 (2009). 
42.  H.R. Rep. No. 112-462, at 21, 66–67 (2013); H.R. Rep. No. 110-921, at 12, 
57 (2009). 
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were cut, presidential figures that were funded exactly, some that were 
increased, and items that were not suggested by the President at all. 
In the tables for 2013, the last two possibilities have nearly disap-
peared.43 There are hardly any items that were not proposed by the 
President, and hardly any increases over the President’s figure. Those 
would be “earmarks” as defined in the rules. The only exceptions would 
be projects that cross state lines, so are for more than one senator. Such 
projects, however, are quite rare.  
The change is not as visible in the bills that were never lists of 
projects in the same way, yet it is significant nonetheless. Members still 
request more spending for various items in the defense appropriations, 
for example. The result was explained to me by one subcommittee 
staffer: 
Throughout the Spring we also get the request letters from mem-
bers. We keep a huge database. And then with the new rules we 
have to pull out the earmarks. That puts a real burden on the 
staff. I get a request to buy more all-terrain vehicles. I have to 
look to see if it’s in his state and then, if a manufacturer is, 
whether there are other manufacturers who are not.44  
As mentioned above, legislators may form coalitions to support 
spending that benefits enough districts to avoid the restriction. They 
will also claim credit in ways described below. But a large portion of 
spending decisions is no longer directed in the bills and reports.  
Anti-spending advocates assert that earmarking continues. 
Examples that they publicize, however, are suspect. For example, 
Citizens Against Government Waste objected to the fact that $50 
million was allocated to the National Guard Counter-Drug Program in 
the FY 2012 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. They argued 
that “this corresponds to nine earmarks totaling $22.9 million in the 
FY 2010 DOD bill.”45 It does not, however, allocate money to any 
particular project. Their claim is tantamount to saying that if an 
account has been earmarked in the past, then any allocation to it now 
must be secretly earmarked. CAGW made similar claims about 
spending for programs ranging from Department of Defense (“DOD”) 
cancer research and alternative energy research to the Heritage 
Partnership Program of the National Park Service.46 These programs 
 
43. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 110-921, at 202 (2009). 
44. Confidential interview, supra note 5. 
45. Citizens Against Government Waste, 2012 Congressional Pig Book 
Summary, at 1 (2012), available at http://cagw.org/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/2012-pig-book.pdf. 
46. See id. at 12. 
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might be good ideas or not, but the appropriations and report language 
did not direct spending to specific states.  
Anti-earmark advocates also assert that earmarking continues on 
back-channels, through letters and phone calls to the agencies— “letter-
marking,” or “phone-marking.” Interests certainly are lobbying the 
executive branch, but that in itself suggests diminished influence by 
Congress.47 Appropriations staff and members emphasize that letter-
marking or phone-marking have been inhibited by White House and 
OMB measures to discipline the agencies. In 2008, President Bush 
issued Executive Order 13,457, which required that agencies “not 
consider the views of a House, committee, Member, officer, or staff of 
the Congress” about any earmark unless it were submitted in writing 
and that all such submissions, subject to potential waiver from OMB, 
be posted on agency websites.48 Interviewees within Congress say this 
has somewhat inhibited contact.49 Moreover, the broader breakdown of 
congressional budgeting means that the incentive for cooperation has 
diminished. In the past, agency officials had to worry that the next 
appropriations bill could include language to punish noncooperation. 
The earmarking ban prevents one form of such language: direct 
instructions to spend money. It does not prevent punishments such as 
cutting the agency’s travel budget in half, or slicing 10 percent from 
the Office of the Secretary. At present, however, there is little need to 
fear such language in next year’s bill. Budgetary gridlock means funding 
is normally in continuing resolutions, which include few new details.  
Senators and representatives still issue press releases to claim 
credit, but their efforts are less direct. For example, Rep. Niki Tsongas 
(D-MA) boasted that she won an amendment requiring that DOD  
47. My interviews over the years showed a growing move within lobbying 
firms toward targeting the executive rather than just Congress—partly 
because support from agencies could help with Congress; partly to ensure 
the agencies cooperated with any congressional instructions; and partly 
because there are only so many people in Congress to lobby. Nevertheless, 
my sources report a clear further shift in emphasis toward lobbying the 
executive after adoption of the earmarking restrictions. 
48. Exec. Order No. 13,457, 3 C.F.R. 175 (2009). The Obama administration 
was reported in late 2011 to be circulating a draft memorandum 
reiterating the position about reporting contacts. See Kevin Bogardus, 
Obama Administration Draft Memo Could Shed Light on “Lettermark-
ing,” The Hill, Nov. 9, 2011, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/ 
192497-obama-administration-draft-memo-could-shed-light-on-lettermark 
ing. However, no such memorandum is listed on the White House website, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/ 
presidential-memoranda.  
49. This restriction itself could be considered a striking extension of executive 
power. However, note that Executive Order 13,457 also included language 
in essence reiterating the 1988 OMB instruction that report language be 
ignored. That part does not appear to have been obeyed. Id.; Porter & 
Walsh, supra note 3, at 10.  
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furnish athletic footwear to recruits, putting in effect the buy-American 
requirement for military purchasing, rather than giving them a cash 
allowance to buy whatever shoes they wish. New Balance does make a 
100 percent American shoe in the district.50 Yet it is not the only 
American manufacturer, so the provision did not guarantee any amount 
of business. Steven Pearce (R-NM) won an amendment that would 
expand the types of nuclear waste that could be processed by a plant 
in his district; but that was not actually an appropriation of funds.51 
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) emphasized that the defense au-
thorization bill “includes $225 million in funding for Industrial 
Mobilization Capacity (IMC) to help arsenals keep their work rates 
competitive. This funding helps Rock Island Arsenal and other arsenals 
compete more effectively for public-private partnerships and other 
business . . . .”52 Yet this did not guarantee funding for Rock Island. 
He took credit for “fully fund[ing] the budget request . . . to extend the 
DOD-VA pilot program at Lovell Federal Health Care Center . . . .”53 
Yet he could not claim credit for funding something the administration 
did not request.54 
IV. Why Congress Ceded Power 
The story of why Congress came to cede power involves multiple 
steps. Earmarks had to become more visible in order to become more 
controversial. Republicans who were disposed to criticize them as cor-
rupt supported what has been termed an explosion of earmarking before 
reversing field and banning the process. A series of responses to 
presidential attacks protected congressional power until, suddenly, they 
did not. Any account must be viewed as a more-or-less plausible 
interpretation, rather than absolute truth. Nevertheless, I would claim 
that the broad outlines are fairly clear. 
We should first consider the general conditions under which 
Congress might cede power to the President. These include: 
(1) Situations in which legislators or those who influence them 
(e.g., voters, other elites) believe presidential initiative is vital to 
address a condition, and congressional response too slow. That is 
 
50. Walter Pincus, “En Bloc,” the New Earmarks, Wash. Post, June 20, 
2013, at A17. 
51. Id. 
52. Press Release, Office of Sen. Dick Durbin, Defense Appropriations Bill 
Makes Critical Investments in Ill. Priorities (July 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=c032f
d19-8ed4-45e7-b5f7-a9c7fcc15c6a. 
53. Id.  
54. Id.  
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a core reason in the national security field and can affect the 
power of the purse in such situations. It does not appear relevant, 
however, to the earmarking dispute. 
(2) Situations in which legislators want to do something that they 
believe constituents could punish them for doing. So long as there 
is some agreement between Congress and the President on what 
good policy would be, they might cede power to him so they avoid 
blame for enacting it. This logic partially explains measures such 
as limitations on amendments to trade legislation, and the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.55 Some 
legislators would give this reason for ceding power to earmark; 
but in general there is less faith that the President can be trusted 
to do what is right. It seems especially unlikely that a Republican 
Congress would give a Democratic President power on these 
grounds. 
(3) Situations in which legislators can reduce blame for doing 
something they consider necessary, yet retain substantial ulti-
mate control. This is the fundamental logic for creation of the 
President’s budget. Congress got the President to propose which 
interests to disappoint in order to keep total spending within 
some desired figure. Congress could then either accept figures 
constituents disliked, and blame the President, or change some of 
them, getting blame for cutting something else but credit for 
helping the beneficiaries. Either response is better for congress-
men than having to disappoint constituents purely on their own 
responsibility.56 This logic also, however, does not apply to the 
earmark restrictions.  
The earmarking situation, instead, involves other dynamics. First, 
some legislators simply did not believe in the power Congress ceded. In 
this case they viewed their institution itself as fundamentally suspect, 
not identifying with its powers and purpose. Second, one party in 
Congress saw political advantage, in its quest to control the federal 
government, from being seen to abandon this power. Third, generalized 
public distrust in Congress made it difficult for the opposing party to 
forthrightly resist the pressure. When they adopted their opponents’ 
rhetoric as part of electoral competition, the Democrats made it more 
difficult for themselves to resist the campaign to abandon congressional 
power.57 Last, a few and mostly irrelevant “scandals” added to the sense 
that congressional power was illegitimate. 
 
55. Pub. L. No. 101-510. 
56. Joseph White, Presidential Power and the Budget, in Federal Budget 
and Financial Management Reform 1, 4 (Thomas D. Lynch ed., 1991).  
57. Something similar happened in the 1980s as the Democrats attacked 
President Reagan for his budget deficits, thereby committing themselves 
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The core reasons why Congress at least temporarily abandoned 
some of its power, therefore, involved fundamental aspects of American 
politics. Congress is divided, and its members often attack the 
institution. This puts it at a distinct disadvantage compared to the 
President. The public in general distrusts Congress as an institution; in 
fact, it distrusts legislative processes. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
wrote, reporting on a combination of survey and focus group data, their 
respondents believed “governmental decisions are not rendered in a 
procedurally just fashion,”58 because some interests have more access 
than others. “Overprofessionalization and inequitable representation 
swirl together in the minds of the people,” and “people do not disting-
uish between essential modern democratic processes and perceived 
abuses of those processes.”59 In the public’s view, “interest groups are 
invariably evil, and Congress’s members are evil for being in any way 
associated with them.”60 The earmark process, which serves discrete 
interests and is dominated by long-serving appropriators and special-
ized staffs, is a perfect target for the distrust they describe. Ira Katznel-
son argues in his interpretation of the New Deal that distrust of 
legislatures and greater trust in executives was so strong, in that time 
of crisis, that support for constitutional democracy, as opposed to rule 
by a strong leader, was in serious doubt.61 If factions within Congress 
turn against Congress, its role will be difficult to preserve. 
President Reagan had his own showdown with Congress over more 
classic direction of spending when he vetoed the Surface Transportation 
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, highlighting its 
 
to policies of deficit reduction that made it difficult for them to make a 
positive case for government. See Joseph White & Aaron Wildavsky, 
The Deficit and the Public Interest: The Search for 
Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s (1989). 
58. John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public 
Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward American Political 
Institutions 146 (1995).  
59. Id. at 146.  
60. Id. at 147. 
61. Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of 
Our Time 12 (2013) (“Parliamentary democracies were widely thought 
to be weak and incapable when compared to the assertive energies of 
Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and the Communist USSR. 
At the heart of this concern was a widespread belief that legislative 
politics, a politics polarized by competing political parties and ideological 
positions, made it impossible for liberal democracies to achieve sufficient 
dexterity and proficiency to solve the big problems of the day. This 
problem seemed especially acute in the United States, whose government 
reflected the most radical separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches of government in the world.”). Katznelson makes 
clear that this preference for the executive was as strong among elites as 
among the public. Id. 
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inclusion of 121 “demonstration projects.”62 “‘I haven’t seen this much 
lard since I handed out blue ribbons at the Iowa State Fair,’” the Presi-
dent proclaimed.63 His veto, however, was overridden.64 As with the 
Carter water project conflict, under current rules the President would 
have won without a fight. The process that led to the 2011 moratoria 
truly began, however, when the processes of less visible relationships 
between legislators and agencies broke down during the Reagan 
administration.  
One reason was that tight presidential budgets excluded spending 
that could have been taken for granted before. In 1989, a senior House 
Appropriations aide commented that 
requests are being made for things they never did before because 
[representatives] did not have to. One of the first letters this year 
was 68 members who were opposed to the budget for the Corps 
requesting that no money be spent for dredging for ports with 
less than 25,000 tons of commercial shipping. That means no 
dredging for recreational boating, which was a big issue on the 
Great Lakes. They have to fight for what they have expected for 
years.65  
The Office of Management and Budget also pressured agencies not 
to make agreements with Congress contrary to the President’s Budget. 
This forced appropriators to put language into the reports, leading to 
OMB Director Miller’s failed initiative. Putting instructions in reports 
or even the law, however, made them more visible, raising the chance 
they would become targets for criticism. 
During the 1980s also, new interests began lobbying for discreet 
benefits, especially universities that sought new facilities. This was 
encouraged by the creation of appropriations lobbying firms, which 
would promote their services to potential clients and so generate 
demand. Then they would use their successes for marketing to other 
universities and local governments.66 This brought more visibility and 
negative publicity to earmarks as the Association of American Univers-
ities criticized them on the grounds that they violated peer review. 
 
62. See U.S. Dept. of Transp., President Ronald Reagan and the Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/rw01e.cfm (last updated Oct. 
15, 2013).  
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Confidential interview, supra note 5. 
66. See Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of 
Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government (2009), 
for a good account of how this business developed, though with some 
highly questionable judgments about the consequences. 
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Nevertheless, many AAU members pursued them anyway, and they 
proliferated in tandem with the criticism of them as a violation of good 
government.67  
As demands increased, some House subcommittee chairs held out, 
much to the frustration of their Senate counterparts; and earmarking 
was limited to a small subset of accounts.68 But the subset grew over 
time as claimants discovered new pots of money. Thus, by the end of 
the 1980s, there was new controversy about distributive politics, mostly 
around the supposed violations of peer review. These controversies 
would not have been as significant, however, if they had not been in 
the context of a titanic clash over budget deficits.  
The deficit issue dominated federal decision-making from 1980 to 
1997.69 One major division involved the extent to which the deficit was 
a revenue problem or a spending problem. The expression “pork barrel” 
was a useful weapon in this conflict, because it connotes greasy politics 
and the idea that some spending is fundamentally corrupt. The notion 
of spending as corruption has been part of the ideology of budget 
balance since the founding of the republic.70 The argument is that 
politicians spend to buy our votes and run deficits in a way honest, 
ordinary Americans could not.  
Therefore, in the late 1980s, ideologically conservative groups like 
Citizens Against Government Waste and Taxpayers for Common Sense 
campaigned to make earmarks, the public part of supposedly “pork-
barrel” spending, more of a political issue. In the 1990s, they started 
publishing lists of earmarks such as Citizens Against Government 
 
67. See James D. Savage, Funding Science in America: Congress, 
Universities, and the Politics of the Academic Pork Barrel 
(1999), for an excellent overview of the rise of academic earmarking. See 
Daniel S. Greenberg, Science, Money, and Politics: Political 
Triumph and Ethical Erosion (2001), for a more extensive overview 
of funding for research and higher education. See Dan Greenberg, 
Academic Pork Has Accomplished a Lot of Good, Chronicle of Higher 
Education (Mar. 25, 2008), http://chronicle.com/blogPost/academic-
pork-has-accomplished-a-lot-of-good/5810, for a good statement of why 
the earmarks could be justified. 
68. James D. Savage, Saints and Cardinals in the Appropriations Subcom-
mittees and the Fight Against Distributive Politics, 16 Legis. Studies Q. 
329 (1991).  
69. See White & Wildavsky, supra note 57, for the origins and buildup of 
the gridlock over deficits. A variety of other works chronicled subsequent 
battles during the 1990s. See George Hager & Eric Pianin, Mirage: 
Why Neither Democrats Nor Republicans Can Balance the 
Budget, End the Deficit, and Satisfy the Public (1997); George 
Hager & Eric Pianin, Balancing Act: Washington’s Troubled 
Path to a Balanced Budget (1998). 
70. James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics 4 (1988).  
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Waste’s “Pig Book” (the actual title).71 In fact, we do not know how 
much of the growing number of visible earmarks in the 1980s and early 
1990s represented a real increase in congressional directions to the 
executive and how much was the old process becoming more visible. 
But some of it was new, and the campaign against earmarks tapped 
into a deep well of public sentiment. 
Once the “pork barrel” had been redefined as “earmarks,” there 
were a series of developments. 
* Beginning in the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in both 
the amount and dollar value of earmarks. Counts by the anti-
government interest groups, Congressional Research Service, and 
OMB used different definitions and data bases.72 Yet by any 
accounting, spending for earmarks rose between the early 1990s, 
the first available data point, and FY 2006, after which it fell but 
still remained higher than in the early 1990s.73 The number of 
earmarks increased much more rapidly than the value, especially 
from the mid-1990s on.  
* The number and total value of earmarks did decline a couple of 
times due to heightened criticism. This happened especially in 
1995, for the fiscal 1996 appropriations, and 2006, for the fiscal 
2007 appropriations.  
* Many Republicans had campaigned against earmarking in the 
1994 election that captured Congress, but House and Senate 
Republicans chose to increase earmarking after their somewhat 
disastrous budgetary clash with President Clinton in 1995–1996. 
Part of the reason was belief that projects would help vulnerable 
 
71. See The Congressional Pig Book, Citizens Against Gov’t Waste, 
http://cagw.org/reports/pig-book/2012 (last visited Feb. 19, 2015), for 
access to annual editions. 
72. The definitions reflected institutional attitudes. Thus, for OMB, if the 
President’s Budget included an item, it was not an earmark. Guidance to 
Agencies on Definitions of Earmarks, Office of Mgmt. and 
Budget, https://earmarks.omb.gov/earmarks-public/earmarks_definiti 
on.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). For CRS, spending that was directed 
to particular constituencies or purposes, whether by the President or 
Congress, was an earmark. Memorandum, Cong. Research Serv., 
Earmarks in Appropriation Acts: FY1994, FY1996, FY1998, 
FY2000, FY2002, FY2004, FY2005 (Jan. 26, 2006), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/m012606.pdf. 
73. See Richard B. Doyle, The Rise and (Relative) Fall of Earmarks: Con-
gress and Reform, 2006–2010, 31 Pub. Budgeting & Fin. 1 (2011), for 
a good comparison of sources. See Cong. Research Serv., supra note 72; 
Carol Hardy Vincent & Jim Monke, Cong. Research Serv., 
R40976, Earmarks Disclosed by Congress: FY2008-FY2010 Regular Ap-
propriations Bills (2010), for CRS data. 
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members win reelection, although claiming credit could be awk-
ward for members who had campaigned on anti-spending plat-
forms.74 Republican leaders also concluded they were going to lose 
to President Clinton on spending totals, so they might as well 
spend on items their members wanted.  
Probably the most important reason was that Republican leaders 
decided members who got specific things for their districts would 
be more easily convinced to vote for bills that, otherwise, had 
aspects they disliked. This was true of both Republicans who 
thought the totals were too large and Democrats who thought 
they were too small. In the House, the key figure was Tom DeLay 
(R-TX), as first Majority Whip and then Majority Leader. The 
challenge, as one senior aide termed it, was “when you have a 6-
vote majority, and never want to lose, how do you do that?” In 
a number of cases, he cut deals75 with John Murtha (D-PA), who 
had a set of rust belt Democrat allies and, in the words of another 
GOP aide, “could swing some votes for the bill even if it had some 
restrictions on regulations or underfunded some accounts.”76 The 
first aide reported that DeLay “said he could bank 100% on 
Murtha, who would deliver 30 votes if he said he would.” 
* Earmarking therefore expanded on a pretty much nonpartisan 
basis. The majority party received a bit more per member, but 
not dramatically more.77 This widened distribution of earmarks, 
which one Republican appropriator called “democratization” in 
an interview and might also be called “institutionalization,” in-
creased expectations on the part of members and required crea-
tion of new procedures to process requests. These procedures, 
such as online submission forms, made it easier to submit requests 
and so may have attracted more. By 2005 or so, there were 
roughly 40,000 requests per year. Only a small portion could be 
 
74. As was expressed to me by some Republicans in interviews at the time. 
75. Confidential interview, supra note 5. See also Jonathan Allen, The 
Earmark Game: Manifest Disparity, CQ Wkly, Oct 1, 2007, at 2836, 
2845, tbl. (describing John Murtha’s “influence,” “primacy,” and respect 
throughout the earmarking process and obtaining the most number of 
earmarks in 2007). 
76. Confidential interview, supra note 5. Frisch & Kelly, supra note 27, 
discuss this period at 141–43. The role of Representative Murtha is also 
described in Allen, supra note 75. 
77. Allen, supra note 75, at 2837 (describing this pattern starting at 2007). It 
was much the same as was reported in my interviews at other times. For 
some bills in the House there was an explicit division, 60% for the majority 
and 40% for the minority. For others it was closer to 50/50. Id. at 2848, 
t.1. In some cases the minority share was allocated to the Democratic 
subcommittee leaders to allocate, subject to oversight meant to ensure 
the projects could be defended.  
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funded, and the volume of requests largely explains why the total 
earmarks rose more quickly than total spending.78 
* As anti-spending groups used earmarks to symbolize their 
cause, the uproar was fed by a few scandals. One, involving 
Republican lobbyist Jack Abramoff, had little to do with 
earmarks and appropriations but was mentioned in stories about 
earmarks anyway.79 Republican Congressman Randy “Duke” 
Cunningham, however, was convicted of accepting bribes in 
return for his efforts to steer earmarks and contracts from his 
position on the defense appropriations subcommittee.80 These 
events were one reason why “Democrats highlighted earmarking 
scandals in their successful 2006 campaign to win back control of 
Congress,” pushing a narrative that linked earmarks to a Repub-
lican “culture of corruption.”81 They thereby amplified the 
conservative anti-earmarkers’ core theme.82 Specific earmarks, 
such as the “Bridge to Nowhere” in Alaska were also attacked.83 
 
78. Allen, supra note 75, at 2837. In 2007, there were 7,000 earmarks in the 
House-passed spending bills, although there were 33,000 requests. Id. Note 
that with 12 bills, and 435 members of the House, this works out to 1.34 
items per member per bill, which may sound less extreme. 
79. See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, The Fast Rise and Steep Fall 
of Jack Abramoff, Wash. Post (Dec. 29, 2005), available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/28/AR20051 
22801588.html.  
80. George E. Condon Jr., Disgraced Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunning-
ham Is a Free Man Again, Nat’l J. Daily (July 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/disgraced-congressman-randy 
-duke-cunningham-is-a-free-man-again-20140710.  
81. Tom Hamburger & Richard Simon, Rep. Lewis a Leader of Earmark 
Pack, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/ 
14/nation/na-earmarks14 (explaining that the Democrats emphasized 
Republican earmarks throughout the 2006 campaign); Steven T. Dennis, 
House Adopts Budget, Earmark Rules, CQ Wkly., Jan. 8, 2007, at 125 
(using the phrase “culture of corruption”). 
82. See, e.g., Timothy R. Homan, Defense Earmarks Squander $1.6 Billion a 
Year, Fiscal Times, May 7, 2014 (“‘Earmarks are the gateway drug to 
the culture of corruption and spending in Washington,’ Sen. Ted Cruz 
(R-TX) said at a news conference . . . .”). 
83. Frisch & Kelly, supra note 27, at 152 (mentioning Abramoff, 
Cunningham, the trial of Senator Ted Stevens, and this bridge). Senator 
Stevens, longtime Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman who was 
accused in October 2008 of taking improper gifts, was railroaded. In order 
to convict Stevens, prosecutors engaged in a “narrative of legal bungling” 
and took a variety of “missteps,” including concealing exculpatory 
evidence. John Bresnahan & Josh Gerstein, Report Blasts Prosecutors in 
Ted Stevens Case, Politico, Mar. 5, 2012, http://www. 
politico.com/news/stories/0312/74056.html. On the substantive merits of 
the bridge from the town of Ketchikan to Gravina Island, see Becky 
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Some of the supposed cases were exaggerated. The Bridge to 
Nowhere was not an absurd idea. It was nowhere because there was no 
bridge to it. The purpose of the bridge was to make it somewhere. But 
the bribery scandals did involve one legitimate point. Defenders of the 
congressional role in distributing benefits say legislators are just doing 
their job, helping their districts. That is why they normally boasted 
about their earmarks. So if legislators do things they do not want 
known—like steer benefits toward campaign contributors—that does 
not fit the argument for why serving their districts is legitimate. 
V. “Reform,” Or, the Anti-Earmark Bidding War 
The Democrats’ capture of Congress began a process in which 
Democrats and earmark defenders (such as members of the Appro-
priations committees) adopted more modest measures, were criticized, 
and were pushed for more radical restrictions—ending with the 
moratoria adopted when the Republicans regained control of Congress 
in 2010.84 The Senate moved less willingly than the House.  
The reforms began with House Democrats adopting, in a series of 
stages, rules that made both earmarks and (just as important) requests 
for earmarks much more visible. This could be justified on the grounds 
above—that legislators should only be asking for items they could 
defend to their constituents, so there was no excuse for secrecy.85 Some 
of the most fervent earmark critics had claimed to object to the process 
because of its lack of transparency, but these reforms did not change 
their position.86 Making all earmarks visible, however, revealed more 
clearly than before that a far disproportionate share of funding was 
going to legislative leaders, appropriators, allies of powerful leaders 
(e.g., the Murtha group), and vulnerable members from both parties.87 
 
Bohrer, Alaska Officials May Find Use for “Bridge to Nowhere,” Seattle 
Times (June 30, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021302 
981_bridgenowherexml.html.  
84. For more detailed accounts of reforms while the Democrats controlled 
Congress, see Doyle, supra note 73, at 1. Frisch & Kelly, supra note 
27; Streeter, supra note 15. 
85. Although secrecy may not seem legitimate, it had some merits. If requests 
were not publicized, members could tell constituents they would forward 
a request, but only forward the ones they believed were most plausible 
and/or most wanted. In short, they could screen requests but blame the 
mysterious committee for disappointing constituents. Once the requests 
became public, members could be blamed for not forwarding every request 
they received so reportedly felt they had to make more requests. 
86. Frisch & Kelly, supra note 27, at 163 (quoting Senator Tom Coburn, 
who defined the evils of earmarking entirely in these terms yet continued 
attacking earmarking as corrupt after the reforms). 
87. Allen, supra note 75. The results were used to argue, for example, that 
there was a racial disparity, with districts represented by minorities being 
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It thus, according to appropriations staff, appears to have increased 
dissatisfaction among the members who were not favored and fed into 
the distrust of special favors and professionalization described by 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse. 
While the 2006 election forced Democrats to seek to address their 
own claims (and some real ones) about the problems with earmarking, 
it also changed the dynamic within the Republican Party. Republicans 
had been divided between fervent anti-earmark members and members 
who thought delivering for their constituencies was part of the job. 
After the election, the former group argued “that the increase in 
earmarks during the 12 years that the Republicans controlled Congress 
was a leading reason why they are now in the minority.”88  
Congressional Republican politics and competition with the Demo-
crats both gave this side the upper hand.  
The basic dynamic seems to fit with how a senior aide described 
the strategic situation for John Boehner (R-OH), who became Majority 
Leader in 2006 after Representative DeLay had to step down due to 
indictment on campaign finance charges. Boehner won narrowly as a 
reform candidate, upsetting Whip Roy Blunt (R-MO).89  
This senior aide related the following: 
What Boehner realized was the leadership was in big trouble. 
DeLay had had his issues . . . . Members had seen the leadership 
pushing for pork, [Speaker] Hastert especially. Blunt represented 
that to some extent, and Boehner looked around and said this 
earmark ban might play with the reformists in the conference who 
think we have lost our way. So he used it as a rallying cry. Before 
that he wasn’t someone who had been crusading against earmarks 
for years, publicly decrying them.90 But it became something that 
he in 2006 could run for the leadership and win because he could 
be the reformist. And there was still a lot of earmarking going on 
in 2007–08. And more reformists coming in. And then in 2009 
they knew they were going to be voting against the bills because  
disadvantaged. Id. There were many reasons why this was not due to 
racial bias, such as that inner-city districts rarely include defense 
contractors. Nevertheless the discussions of this pattern in the Allen 
article indicate how the data could increase divisions. The politics of 
distributing constituency benefits in fact had always favored the same 
members, though perhaps with less attention to vulnerable members, 
roughly in order of how important they were to passing the legislation.  
88. David Clarke, Earmarks: Here to Stay or Facing Extinction?, CQ Wkly., 
Mar. 16, 2009, at 613. 
89. See Jonathan Weisman, In an Upset, Boehner Is Elected House GOP 
Leader, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2006, at A01.  
90. Boehner could, however, criticize earmarks with little fear of being called 
a hypocrite, as he is widely reported to be among the few members who 
did not request them. 
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they had too much spending, so using earmarks was an easier way 
of criticizing the bills. If you’re arguing about 6% or 8% more for 
Labor/H [the Labor/HHS appropriations bill], you’re arguing on 
Democratic terms, about helping kids. With earmarks you didn’t 
have to fight about the merits of funding education, you could 
fight on “wasteful spending.” 
House Republican leadership therefore had strong and consistent 
incentives to push for an earmark ban, and did so.91  
The debate over different reforms from 2007 through 2010 was 
complicated and not entirely partisan. Republican Appropriators, espe-
cially, tended to object to eliminating earmarks. One could look at 
public statements at any given time and infer that Republicans were 
divided and might not, if they took power, go through with their pro-
mise or threat to ban earmarks.92 House Republican leaders strongly 
endorsed the moratorium, but Senate Republican leaders were less con-
sistent.  
Nevertheless, the GOP clearly was becoming more and more com-
mitted to the moratorium. The rise of the Tea Party activated the 
portion of the Republican base that was most fervently convinced 
government spending is corrupt and that was represented in some 
primary contests.93 President Obama himself (behaving as presidents 
often do) attacked congressional earmarking. In the wake of what was 
widely perceived as a Tea Party victory in the 2010 election, House 
 
91. At this writing, the press releases from the time are on Speaker 
Boehner’s website. See, e.g., Now Will Speaker Pelosi Join Republicans 
in an Earmark Freeze?, Speaker Boehner’s Press Office (Mar. 23, 
2008), http://www.speaker.gov/general/broken-earmark-process-full-dis 
play-another-house-democrat-exposed (pointing out that then-Speaker 
Pelosi had not joined Republicans in an effort to reform earmarking, 
though other Democrats had).  
92. For an excellent analysis of the factions within Congress, see Kerry 
Young, An Earmark by Any Other Name, CQ Wkly., Nov. 22, 2010, at 
2698–2700; Liriel Higa, 110th House Committees: Appropriations, CQ 
Wkly., Nov. 13, 2006, at 2990–91; David Clarke, Steering Away From 
Earmark Rules, CQ Wkly., Oct. 12, 2009, at 2275; David Clarke, Having 
It Both Ways on Federal Spending, CQ Wkly., Jan. 4, 2010, at 8; David 
Clarke & Edward Epstein, Earmark Bans Get a Frosty Reception, CQ 
Wkly., Mar. 15, 2010, at 634; Edward Epstein, Earmarking in an Anti-
Earmark World, CQ Wkly., May 3, 2010, at 1068. For a strong pro-
earmark statement by one of the most conservative senators, framed in 
terms of the dangers of leaving the power to a liberal President, see James 
M. Inhofe, Eliminating Earmarks Is a Phony Issue, Nat’l Rev. Online, 
Nov. 12, 2010, 7:00 AM), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
corner/253159/eliminating-earmarks-phony-issue-james-m-inhofe.  
93. See, e.g., Melissa Attias, Earmarks That Once Were Delicacies Now Are 
Poison, CQ Wkly., June 28, 2010, at 1542 (noting that some Republican 
House members who once bought into earmarking now argue that 
earmarking was “hijacked by spending interests”).  
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Republicans did what they said they would do; and the Senate, fairly 
meekly, followed along. 
Conclusion: Prospects for Reversal 
In the course of my interviews about earmarking in 2013–2014, I 
encountered a number of Republican ex-legislators and senior Repub-
lican staff involved with appropriations who consider the earmarking 
ban bad for Congress and for their members. They did not see why it 
is in their interest to cede power to the President. They believed that 
the most fundamental reason for budgetary gridlock is the ideological 
distance between Republicans in Congress and the President but also 
that even if Speaker Boehner wanted to pass appropriations, it was 
made more difficult by the fact that it was now much harder to give 
members—even appropriators—reason to vote for a bill. In 2013, one 
such individual explained that 
it is very hard to get Democrats in the House or Republicans in 
the Senate to vote for the bills, in at least half of the 
subcommittees. There, earmarks could help because politicians 
are pretty good at finding reasons for saying either yes or no. So 
in a giant Interior bill you could say, this does cut EPA by 3%, 
it helps reduce regulation, and I get this project that is important 
for my district. Or, I get this dredging for Charleston. So it 
provides ammunition to justify a vote. It’s not the solution but it 
would help.94 
These sentiments also were reflected in numerous reports in the 
public press.95 Yet, in spite of reports of hidden sentiment in favor of 
loosening the ban, nothing of the sort has occurred. In November 2014, 
Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) proposed to the House Republican 
Conference that earmarking to state and local governments be allowed; 
he was defeated by a wide margin, with Speaker Boehner saying the 
idea would pass “over my dead body.”96 Republican politicians can 
certainly see that support for earmarks remains highly unpopular 
 
94. Confidential interview, supra note 5. 
95. See, e.g., Sam Stein & Ryan Grim, Harry Reid Wants to Revive Earmarks 
and Says a Top House Republican Does Too, Huff. Post (June 26, 2014, 
12:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/26/harry-reid-
earmarks_n_5531388.html (pointing out that “Congress may be warming 
up to earmarking” again); Frank Oliveri, Cardinals With Clipped Wings, 
CQ Wkly., Oct. 21, 2013, at 175054 (reporting on Republican House 
appropriators wanting to allow earmarks again); Katy O’Donnell, House 
GOP Wistful for Days of Earmarks, Nat’l J., May 15, 2012. 
96. Associated Press, House GOP: Give Up Gavel If Seeking New Office, N.Y. 
Times Nov. 14, 2014, 2:33 PM, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline 
/2014/11/14/us/politics/ap-us-house-gop-chairmen.html.  
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among their base, as was evidenced when Senator Thad Cochran, who 
had chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee in 2005–2006 and is 
now chair again, was nearly denied renomination for his seventh term 
by an opponent who attacked him for earmarking.97 My interview 
respondents who wanted earmarking restored had no suggestions about 
how that would be accomplished. 
A Democratic House might end the earmark moratorium, and then 
the Senate might return to its instincts and go along. But a Democratic 
House does not look all that likely at the moment. Moreover, its 
members might not want to immediately attract attacks by returning 
to “corrupt” practices. One could never be sure of what will happen. 
But for the moment, Congress has abandoned a share of its power of 
the purse, and the way back to power is not visible. 
 
 
97. On the attacks about earmarking, see Richard Fausset, Federal Largess 
in Mississippi Helped a GOP Senator, Until It Hurt Him, N.Y. Times, 
June 18, 2014, at A14. Cochran won only after a massive infusion of funds 
from national Republican elites such as the Chamber of Commerce, and 
appeals for votes from voters who were very much not part of the GOP 
base, such as African Americans, who did not want his tea party opponent 
to win. See Alexander Burns, How Thad Cochran Bounced Back from 
Disaster, Politico (June 25, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2014/06/how-thad-cochrans-campaign-pulled-it-off-108276.html.  
